Abstract

Abstract:
According to the United Nations, about 40% of the inter-state regional disputes globally, that cause serious threats to security, occur due to desire to have control over natural resources. In this resource-scarce world, Asia-Pacific is the only region which has natural resources in abundance be it land-based (Gas, Minerals) or marine-based (Water, Oil) etc. The Asia-pacific is the geopolitical hub of the struggle for global power. Asia pacific is said to be the most economic dynamic region of the world. According to the World Bank, It contributes 40% to the world’s economy after the US and the EU as of 2012 survey. According to IMF estimation, it is also expected to beat EU’s and US’s economy by 2030. This immense economic growth potential of the region has created an insecure environment in the region not only among the states regionally but outside the geographical region internationally also. Competition for the economic gains and benefits has given rise to so many disputes causing insecurity in the region. The purpose of this writing is to highlight the major security concerns in the Asia-Pacific region and give recommendations re it.
Introduction:
The Asia-Pacific area is going through massive change with a rapid increasing level of economic growth competiton and deepening of regional and global integration. Significant demographic and income shifts in key nations, rising nationalism, and a growing public awareness of assertiveness toward many sensitive occurrences beyond national borders. These forces and others are generating a shift in the distribution and expression of economic, political, and military power across the region. In general, the region is moving away from the narrow domestic social concerns and bipolar ideological rivalries of the Cold War era, toward a far more complex security environment. This security environment is marked by the emergence of several new power centers (notably China and, to a lesser extent, India, but also a range of dynamic smaller nations such as South Korea and Indonesia), more intense and crosscutting levels of regional cooperation and rivalry, and, in many states, an increasingly close relationship among domestic nationalism, rapid (and sometimes highly disruptive) social change, and external economic, military, and political events. Overall, these developments are intensifying certain types of interstate rivalries over issues of territorial sovereignty, resource competition, energy security, and market position and access. At the same time, they are creating incentives for cooperation in handling a growing array of common security-related problems, from climate change to pandemics, terrorism, and global financial instability.
Four sets of factors that will influence the evolution of security environments in the Asia-Pacific over the next twenty-five years:
1. Domestic political and social stability
2. Defense spending and military capabilities
3. National and transnational objectives, military doctrines, and approaches to the use of force
4. Interstate bilateral and multilateral relationships
Five Possible Security Environments Five different security environments could emerge in the Asia-Pacific region over the next twenty-five years (listed in order of likelihood):
I. Status Quo Redux: Constrained but ongoing economic and political competition alongside continuing cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region
II. Asia-Pacific Cold War: Deepening regional bipolarization and militarization, driven by a worsening U.S.-China strategic and economic rivalry in Asia
III. Pacific Asia-Pacific: Increased U.S.-China and regional cooperation and tension reduction
IV. Asian Hot Wars: Episodic but fairly frequent military conflict in critical hot spots, emerging against a cold war backdrop as described in the Asia-Pacific Cold War scenario
V. Challenged Region: A region beset by social, economic, and political instability and unrest separate from U.S.-China competition
Status Quo Redux
The Status Quo Redux security environment is characterized by constrained but ongoing economic and political competition alongside continuing cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. Within this environment, national objectives and military doctrines in the United States and China and across the Asia-Pacific would remain development-oriented and restrained or nonconfrontational, involving continued high levels of mutually beneficial economic and political engagement and cooperation in the management of transnational issues. At the same time, major suspicions and uncertainties would remain regarding the ultimate security intentions and capabilities of Beijing and Washington toward one another, especially over the long term. This would result in continuing efforts by the United States and China, as well as other countries, to strengthen counterbalancing military capabilities or maintain hedging options. Defense spending and military capital stocks would thus continue to increase, albeit not at rates above historical levels. Consequently, although engagement in the region would still be positive-sum, the security environment would likely witness intensifying patterns of military competition and rivalry.
Asia-Pacific Cold War
The Asia-Pacific Cold War security environment is characterized by deepening regional bipolarization and militarization, driven by a worsening U.S.-China strategic and economic rivalry in Asia. In the political or diplomatic sphere, this could involve zero-sum competitions for influence over the Korean Peninsula, intensive U.S. efforts to strengthen its alliances and obstruct or reverse the further integration of Taiwan with mainland China, U.S.-China competition over the political allegiance of large and small nonaligned powers, U.S. attempts to entice or pressure India into a strategic alliance against Beijing, more aggressive Chinese actions toward Taiwan and disputed maritime territories, and rivalry for dominant influence in important multilateral diplomatic forums and structures in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. In the economic sphere, a U.S.-China cold war would likely involve intense efforts by both countries to expand bilateral and multilateral trade, investment, energy, and technology interactions across the region at the expense of the other side. In the military and defense sphere, this environment would almost by definition necessitate an expanding and intensifying security competition requiring high levels of defense spending and accumulating military capital stocks. It would probably also involve an intense arms race over the ability to control the first and second island chain, and perhaps beyond. Ultimately, this environment is defined by a strong belief in both the United States and China that vital national interests could not be ensured without greatly restricting the capacity and influence of the other side.
Pacific Asia-Pacific The Pacific Asia-Pacific security environment is characterized by increased U.S.-China and regional cooperation and reduced tension. This environment would evince a clear and sustained decrease in the number and severity of destabilizing events across the AsiaPacific, including political-military crises, changes in alliances, tensions over trade and investment practices, and disputes over the management of regional and global security issues. Instead, most nations would concentrate a high level of resources and attention on domestic social and economic issues and the peaceful resolution or management of common transnational threats and issues of concern. Differences and even some significant disputes would certainly remain over a variety of issues, but they would not generate zero-sum approaches or solutions.
Asian Hot Wars
The Asian Hot Wars security environment is characterized by episodic but fairly frequent military conflict in critical hot spots, emerging against a cold war backdrop as described in the Asia-Pacific Cold War scenario. Such military conflict could occur deliberately or escalate from unforeseen accidents. It would likely take place as a result of a dispute over Taiwan, maritime territories in the East or South China Seas, freedom of navigation issues along China’s maritime periphery, or the Korean Peninsula. In this environment, both Washington and Beijing would develop war-oriented national objectives and military doctrines and would engage in intensely competitive efforts to expand influence across the Asia-Pacific through political, military, and economic means. Sustained, very high levels of defense spending and accumulated military capital stocks would likely be maintained among all major powers, as well as efforts to strengthen or create military alliances and other forms of adversarial behavior evident in the Asia-Pacific Cold War environment. Mutually hostile domestic political environments could further increase the rigidity of elite opinion and lead to a highly unstable political-diplomatic environment. Overall, this environment showcases an increased reliance on military instruments to advance interests, reduce vulnerabilities, and ensure credibility.
Challenged Region
The Challenged Region security environment is characterized by social, economic, and political instability and unrest separate from U.S.-China competition. Political leaders would focus in a sustained manner on dealing with urgent—indeed, virtually overwhelming—common problems such as climate change, pollution, pandemics, domestic political and social unrest, and terrorism, while the need or opportunity to pursue historical rivalries or engage in forms of security competition would decline. Ultimately, as in the Pacific Asia-Pacific environment, the level of interstate tension and conflict would be consistently low and the incentives to cooperate much higher. Defense spending would thus decline or remain level as states focused more resources on dealing with domestic and foreign regional and global challenges. Security concerns would remain, but their salience as urgent issues requiring attention would decline in the political calculations of leaders and the sentiments of the public.
Strategic Risks
The most overall significant risk for the United States involves movement toward the competitive and conflictual side of the Status Quo Redux security environment. This risk would be most salient in the short to medium term (although it could emerge only over a longer time frame) and would result in the long-term danger of a transition toward an Asia-Pacific Cold War–type environment. This type of evolution of the Asian security environment ultimately presents several primary and secondary risks. The first primary risk is a steady, strategic shift of resources in many Asian states away from peaceful and cooperative economic development toward greater arms development or racing, along with various types of zero-sum political, economic, and military security competition and rivalry. The second primary risk consists of an increased tendency among key regional states to engage in tests of resolve or efforts to “lock in” advantages over territorial and resource disputes in the seas along China’s maritime periphery. The third, occurring directly as a result of the previous risk, is a significant danger of the United States becoming embroiled in confrontations between local disputants, many of which are U.S. allies or partners. The fourth primary risk involves a general weakening of relative U.S. power over the medium to long term and the overall cohesion of the U.S. alliance system in the Asia-Pacific. The secondary risks presented by the changing security environment include: the possibility of increasing tensions over various types of bilateral and multilateral political and economic arrangements that favor some countries over others or seek to exclude specific countries; increasing domestic unrest and political repression in key states associated with economic, demographic, and political difficulties; and domestic instability and the rise of ultranationalist forces in China. Another secondary risk could result from U.S. miscalculations or overreaction in response to a more powerful and assertive China.
Strategic Opportunities
Fortunately, a range of factors conducive to current and future strategic opportunity also exists in the Asia-Pacific region. These factors could serve to restrain or even eliminate many of the strategic risks. They include common support for continued economic growth and access to resources; the absence of deeply adversarial and existential disputes; the high likelihood that Washington will continue to exercise strong, if not clearly dominant, economic, military, and political influence across the Asia-Pacific region; the possibility that a stronger, more secure, and confident Beijing might become more flexible and accommodating in the future, especially in altercations with neighbors; the possibility of more cooperation in dealing with North Korea; and the imperative on the part of most Asian states to maintain cooperation in addressing various types of future transnational, nontraditional security threats, from pandemics, terrorism, and piracy to the health of the international economic order and common energy security challenges.
Diplomatic Recommendations
Much of the analysis in this report confirms that the evolution of the security environment in the Asia-Pacific over the next twenty-five to thirty years will be heavily—and in some cases decisively—influenced by the actions of the United States. In other words, the challenges and opportunities confronting the United States and PACOM in the Asia-Pacific are not simply developments to which Washington and Honolulu must respond; they exist and will evolve as a result of the actions U.S. leaders take now and in the future. While the United States remains the strongest and most influential power across the region, its ability to shape the region will likely diminish, especially if Asian (and particularly Chinese) economic growth continues at a relatively rapid pace, as expected. As a result, the development of a long-range strategy that can extract the maximum benefits out of an increasingly complex and possibly limiting security environment will be essential. The analysis of this report suggests a range of possible policy recommendations for the U.S. government and PACOM. First, the U.S. government should undertake an interagency discussion aimed at identifying the long-term primary, secondary, and tertiary strategic interests of the United States in the Asia-Pacific in the context of the dynamic changes identified in this report.