An argument for central bank independence relies on the assumption that if the government was fully responsible for the conduct of monetary policy

An argument for central bank independence relies on the assumption that if the
government was fully responsible for the conduct of monetary policy, its preference for inflation would fluctuate according to the pressure on politicians facing re-election to deliver short term employment and output results, which will trigger undue inflation (Fischer,
1995). This implies that the variation in the changes in the price level will force inflation expectations to be above the real long term preferences of market agents and the median voter. Therefore the only way to achieve the public’s long term preference for a low inflation rate is by insulating the conduct of monetary policy from the short run fluctuations of the political cycle by letting an independent central bank regulate economic activity
(Alesina ; Summers, 1993). This argument is elitist because it is based on the
notions that the government cannot be trusted with the means to pursue its economic objectives, and most importantly that individuals are fundamentally self-interested people that maximize their life outcomes, irrespective of how their behavior will affect others.
While this assumption allows elegant demonstration of the principal agent problem using game theory and other mathematical tools, it is sociologically unrealistic (Henrich ; al, 2001). In reality, all individuals, politicians included, base their decisions on their recognition of their interdependence with others, and seek to maximize communal outcomes as opposed to individual ones. For an excellent critique of the assumption that Homo Economicus is
fundamentally self interested, consult: Henrich ; al, 2001. 7
Secondly, Neo Classical economists believe that inflation is the only legitimate target of monetary policy, because in the long run (LR) monetary policy is incapable of affecting real variables as the economy always operates at its potential in the LR, irrespective of the price
level. Those views on inflation are based on the quantity theory of money which is nothing more than an identity that cannot be falsified considering the fact that empirically velocity is not constant like it was theorized by Milton Friedman (Duca ; VanHoose, 2004). Graphically this theoretical view is represented by a vertical LR output supply curve, and any change in the money supply, which in turn shifts the aggregate demand, has no impact on output in the LR, because the price level would adjust proportionally to the change